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THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: ITS
SIGNIFICANCE FOR U.S. BILATERAL
TRADE WITH KOREA AND TAIWAN
Judith H. Bello* and Alan F. Holmer**
I. OVERVIEW
The trade policy of most nations involves an intricate choreogra-
phy of multilateral, plurilateral,' bilateral, and unilateral measures.
Since World War II and the establishment in 1947 of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),2 the United States has con-
centrated its efforts in the multilateral GATT forum, which has com-
pleted seven "rounds" of multilateral trade negotiations aimed at
liberalizing world trade.
However, the United States has never limited its trade policy to
GATT activity. When necessary and appropriate, the United States
has sought to complement the effective functioning of the GATT with
plurilateral, bilateral, and - occasionally - unilateral undertakings.
For example, the U.S. has addressed such trade-related issues as ex-
port credits and steel and shipping subsidies with other NATO mem-
ber countries, Japan, and Australia in the plurilateral Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development. It has entered into bilateral
free trade agreements with Israel 3 and Canada,4 as well as a host of
other commercial agreements with countries around the globe, from
broadly aimed treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation to nar-
rowly tailored issue- or sector-specific agreements, such as the U.S.-
Japan Semiconductor Arrangement. 5 Occasionally, the United States
also has felt compelled to resort to unilateral action (as in response to
* Mrs. Bello is a partner in Sidley & Austin's Washington, D.C. office. She previously
served as the General Counsel for the U.S. Trade Representative, among several other govern-
ment positions.
** Mr. Holmer is also a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Sidley & Austin. He
previously served as the Deputy U.S. Trade Representative and General Counsel for the U.S.
Trade Representative, among several other government positions. The authors wish to express
their appreciation for the assistance of Celia G. Jones in writing this article.
1. "Multilateral" refers to agreements and activities open to broad participation; "pluri-
lateral" refers to agreements and activities of more limited participation (such as the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development).
2. Opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
3. Apr. 22, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 653.
4. Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281.
5. Sept. 2, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1408.
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Japan's breach of the Semiconductor Arrangement), 6 in the hope that
the proportional countermeasures would induce an otherwise reluc-
tant trading partner to effect desired trade reforms.
While a panoply of multilateral, plurilateral, bilateral, and unilat-
eral trade actions is always available, the mix of measures used in the
choreography of U.S. trade policy has shifted over time. After the
GATT was founded, the United States initially relied extremely heav-
ily on that body for most of its major trade initiatives and activity. As
time passedi however, the U.S. began to resume more activity outside
the GATT context. The U.S. became more receptive to non-multilat-
eral initiatives following the disappointing 1982 GATT Ministerial
Meeting. Thus, when the U.S. trade deficit skyrocketed in 1985, the
domestic political environment was ripe for more creative, expeditious
approaches to resolving trade problems, complementing the multilat-
eral but slower avenues available in the GATT.
In 1985, then, the U.S. - while still supportive of, and committed
to, the GATT - began to use its trade remedy laws more aggres-
sively, seeking at least interim improvements (if not solutions) in less-
than-multilateral contexts. For the first time, the President and U.S.
Trade Representative initiated investigations 7 under the export-ori-
ented section 3018 remedy on their own motion, and resorted - albeit
reluctantly - to unilateral action when faced with the intransigence of
a trading partner.9 The U.S. also concluded a free trade agreement
6. Proclamation 5631 of Apr. 17, 1987, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,412 (1987) [hereinafter Japan Semi-
conductor Proclamation]; see also Semiconductor Industry Association, 50 Fed. Reg. 28,866
(1985) (initiation of investigation); Memorandum of July 31, 1986, 51 Fed. Reg. 27,811 (1986)
(Presidential response under section 301); U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Arrangement, 52 Fed. Reg.
10,275 (1987) (request for comments on possible U.S. response) [hereinafter Japan Semiconduc-
tor Arrangement]; Japan Semiconductor Case, 52 Fed.'Reg. 22,693 (1987) (suspension of some
sanctions); Japan Semiconductor Case, 52 Fed. Reg. 43,146 (1987) (suspension of some
sanctions).
7. Brazil's Informatics Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 37,608 (1985) (initiation of investigation under
section 301); Korea's Restrictions on Insurance Services, 50 Fed. Reg. 37,609 (1985) (initiation
of investigation under section 301); Japan's Practice with Respect to Tobacco Products, 50 Fed.
Reg. 37,609 (1985) (initiation of investigation under section 301); and Korean Protection of In-
tellectual Property Rights, 50 Fed. Reg. 45,883 (1985) (initiation of investigation under section
301).
8. Trade Act of 1974, § 301, (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (Supp. 1988)).
9. See, e.g., Proclamation 5354 of June 21, 1985, 50 Fed. Reg. 26,143 (1985) (increase in duty
for pasta articles from the EEC); Proclamation 5363 of Aug. 15, 1985, 50 Fed. Reg. 33,711
(1985) (modification of effective date for increased duty on pasta from the EEC); Proclamation
5448 of Mar. 16, 1986, 51 Fed. Reg. 9435 (1986) (increase in the rate of duty on Japanese
leather); Proclamation 5478 of May 15, 1986, 51 Fed. Reg. 18,296 (1986) (imposition of quanti-
tative restrictions on imports from the EEC); Japan Semiconductor Proclamation, supra note 6;
Japan Semiconductor Arrangement, supra note 6; and Proclamation 5759 of Dec. 24, 1987, 52
Fed. Reg. 49,131 (1987) (increasing the rate of duty on certain products from the European
Community). See generally Bello & Holmer, U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series # 13: Unilateral
Action to Open Foreign Markets: The Mechanics of Retaliation Exercises, 22 INT'L LAW. 1197,
1199-1201 (1988).
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with Israel, and embarked on free trade negotiations with its largest
trading partner, Canada.
Despite its increasing resort to these other types of trade initiatives,
the U.S. remains committed to the GATT and believes that in many
(if not most) cases, effective multilateral solutions are generally prefer-
able to less-than-multilateral approaches. Reflecting this view, the
U.S. was instrumental in helping to launch the eighth Uruguay Round
of multilateral trade negotiations in September 1986. Today, as the
U.S. Trade Representative, Ambassador Carla A. Hills, reiterates
everywhere she speaks, the Uruguay Round is her office's first, second,
and third priority.10
This article reviews the choreography of U.S. trade policy, as re-
flected in the U.S. government's efforts to reconcile its objectives in the
Uruguay Round with its actions in its bilateral relationships with Ko-
rea and Taiwan. It illustrates how developments in four key areas of
the Round - protection of intellectual property, services, investment,
and agriculture - and in bilateral trade negotiations are intended to
be, and can be, complementary rather than contradictory.
In conclusion, it stresses the importance of the recent market-
opening agreements with Korea and trade-liberalizing reforms by Tai-
wan. To the extent that the Uruguay Round succeeds, there should be
less need for such bilateral initiatives in the future,I and the agree-
ments or reforms recently achieved may serve as a prelude to multilat-
eral reforms. To the extent that the Uruguay Round does not succeed,
on the other hand, recent developments with Korea and Taiwan sug-
gest that U.S. problems with those countries may continue to be re-
solved amicably, avoiding resort to unilateral action, reducing bilateral
tensions, and increasing opportunities to facilitate trade.
II. MAJOR U.S. OBJECTIVES IN THE URUGUAY ROUND
The first six rounds of multilateral trade negotiations under the
GATT, concluding with the Kennedy Round in 1967, significantly re-
duced tariffs around the globe. The seventh, or Tokyo Round, which
10. See, e.g., Statement Before Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means
3 (Feb. 28, 1989) (statement of Carla A. Hills, U.S. Trade Rep.) (on file at U.S. Trade Rep.);
Statement Before Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce 3 (Mar.
2, 1989) (statement of Carla A. Hills, U.S. Trade Rep.) (on file at U.S. Trade Rep.); Testimony
Before Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies of the Senate
Comm. on Appropriations 4 (Mar. 7, 1989) (testimony of Ambassador Carla A. Hills) (on file at
U.S. Trade Rep.).
II. Taiwan is not a GATT Contracting Party and thus is not a participant in the Uruguay
Round. However, U.S.-Taiwan trade is expected to reflect the multilateral rules agreed to in the
Round, eliminating or at least reducing the need to develop special rules for U.S.-Taiwan trade.
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concluded in 1979, took the first brave but faltering steps toward liber-
alization of some major nontariff barriers, including government pro-
curement, antidumping and countervailing duty actions, and technical
barriers to trade (standards). The eighth, "Uruguay" Round,
launched in September 1986, seeks to transform the Tokyo Round's
first steps regarding nontariff barriers into more sweeping, lasting, and
effective achievements.
A primary aim of United States efforts in the Uruguay Round is to
expand the GATT to include several new areas of growing importance
to world trade: trade-related investment, services, and intellectual
property. The United States seeks as well to improve the GATT's
application in traditional areas, including trade-distorting agricultural
subsidies. 12
Both traditional trade problems such as agricultural subsidies, and
the "frontier" trade issues - trade-related investment measures
(TRIMs) and barriers to trade in services and intellectual property -
have assumed increasing economic significance since the Tokyo
Round concluded in 1979. Pending multilateral reforms in these ar-
eas, the United States has had to rely on bilateral negotiations with
various trading partners and occasionally, unilateral action to over-
come barriers and to open markets.
Under the Reagan Administration's free and fair trade policy
aimed at opening world markets and liberalizing trade, the United
States in 1985 began to use its trade laws more aggressively to achieve
numerous bilateral agreements that have significantly expanded export
opportunities for American and third country firms. 13 This more ag-
gressive approach to trade policy was effectively codified in the so-
called "Super" and "Special" 301 provisions of the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988,14 which require the United States
Trade Representative to identify "priority countries" for negotiations
aimed at eliminating key trade-distorting practices of major trading
partners. Recent initiatives under "Super" and "Special" 301 have led
to significant reforms affecting intellectual property, investment, in-
dustry, and agriculture by both South Korea and Taiwan.'"
12. See supra note 10.
13. Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program 1
(1988).
14. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1302, 102 Stat.
1107, 1176 (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2420).
15. See, e.g., Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Hills.: Korea to Liberalize Trade and Investment
(May 18, 1989) (on file at U.S. Trade Rep.); Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Hills Announces
Agreement with Korea on Agriculture (May 19, 1989) (on file at U.S. Trade Rep.); U.S. Trade
Rep. Fact Sheet, "Special 301" on Intellectual Property 4 (May 25, 1989) (on file at U.S. Trade
[Vol. 11:307
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The United States recognizes, however, that many trade issues
may be better resolved through multilateral agreements under GATT
auspices than through bilateral initiatives alone. Bilateral negotiations
by definition include only two countries, whereas increasingly the
most complex and difficult trade problems require a multilateral solu-
tion. Moreover, bilateral talks consume significant time and resources
because they require separate negotiations with individual trading
partners. Aspects of the problems that prompted the bilateral negotia-
tions with, for example, Korea and Taiwan are likely to arise in trade
relations between the United States and other countries as well, requir-
ing the United States to negotiate its priorities repeatedly. Moreover,
concessions may be harder to obtain in a bilateral context, which can
be more confrontational and which lacks general rules governing the
issues to which many countries have agreed. In addition, bilateral at-
tempts to resolve a problem can enable other countries to be "free
riders," reaping the advantage of more liberal trade without making
reciprocal concessions. 16
Because GATT negotiations involve a broad range of issues and
sectors, they facilitate a comprehensive approach to resolving a
number of interrelated issues. The Uruguay Round affords the United
States an opportunity to negotiate the elimination of many of the types
of barriers enumerated as priority practices under "Super 301.'17 To
the extent that the Uruguay Round succeeds in developing a multilat-
eral consensus, the tensions inevitably created by successive bilateral
negotiations between the United States and various trading partners
can be reduced. Moreover, the perception that all United States trad-
ing partners are being treated fairly and equitably can be enhanced.
We turn now to a more detailed analysis of major initiatives in the
Uruguay Round negotiations and how they affect U.S. bilateral trade
relations with Korea and Taiwan in particular.
A. Intellectual Property
1. Its Significance and Its Currently Inadequate Protection
The share of United States exports that rely heavily on protection
of patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets - "intellectual
property rights" - has more than doubled in the postwar period, and
Rep.) [hereinafter Special 301 Fact Sheet]; Statement of Ambassador Carla A. Hills 5-6 (May 25,
1989) (on file at U.S. Trade Rep.) [hereinafter May 25 Statement].
16. U.S. Trade Rep. Fact Sheet, "Super 301" Trade Liberalization Priorities 8 (May 25, 1989)
(on file at U.S. Trade Rep.) [hereinafter Super 301 Fact Sheet].
17. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1302, 102 Stat.
1107, 1176-79.
Winter 1990]
Michigan Journal of International Law
now amounts to over one quarter of total United States exports. 18
These products include chemicals, pharmaceuticals, computers,
software, movies, sound recordings, books, and scientific equipment.
Lack of adequate and effective protection of intellectual property
rights in many foreign markets is a significant and growing non-tariff
barrier to trade in goods and services. A report released in February
1988 by the United States International Trade Commission estimates
that worldwide annual losses to United States industry because of in-
adequate protection of intellectual property rights are between $43
and $61 billion.' 9 United States videocassette interests report that
they lose $350 million annually to pirates in just one developed coun-
try market; and that foreign markets, both developed and developing,
are from twenty to one hundred percent comprised of pirated
material. 20
The United States is losing the competitive edge gained from the
research, development, innovation, and creativity that flourish when
investment in creative development is rewarded with exclusive rights
that enable the establishment of a foothold in foreign markets. More-
over, deficiencies in intellectual property rights protection reduce the
value of previously negotiated trade concessions, because copied goods
displace legitimate exports of products from countries that adequately
and effectively protect intellectual property rights.
There are several international intellectual property conventions,
but standards contained in some of these conventions provide neither
adequate protection for intellectual property rights nor effective en-
forcement mechanisms. 21 Many countries do not belong to any of the
conventions. Some countries do not even have patent, copyright, or
trademark laws.
Even in those countries that do have patent, copyright, and trade-
mark laws, protection is often less than adequate. For example, the
terms for patents may be as short as seven years, and for copyrights,
twenty. These terms often prove too short to permit the innovator
18. Intellectual Property, Domestic Productivity, and Trade. Oversight Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property and Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (July 25, 1989) (statement of Ambassador Carla A. Hills)
[hereinafter Statement of Ambassador Carla A. Hills].
19. Foreign Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and the Effect on U.S. Trade and
Industry, Inv. No. 332-TA-245, USITC Pub. 2065, at H-3 (Feb. 1988).
20. Uruguay Round Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, Sub-
mission by the United States 2 (undated) (on file at U.S. Trade Rep.) [hereinafter United States
TRIPs Submission].
21. See, e.g., Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, T.I.A.S. No. 8733;
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, as revised, Oct. 23, 1978,
33 U.S.T. 2703, T.I.A.S. No. 10199.
(Vol. 11:307
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time to test the product, market it, and achieve an adequate return on
investment. 22 Moreover, patent protection is often limited to the pro-
cess by which the item is manufactured and does not extend to the
product itself. This means that if an infringer can figure out how to
make the product by another method, the infringer's product will have
equally legitimate status with the original product. Some countries
provide only limited protection for audio and video recordings and
cable transmissions. In addition, the scope of protection for new tech-
nologies and forms of authorship - such as software, semiconductor
chips, and biotechnologies - varies from country to country.23
Under most national laws, the government can issue compulsory
licenses if the product is not being "worked." With this device, the
government can legally revoke the patent holder's exclusive rights to
produce the licensed product and allow someone else to share in those
rights. Some countries allow compulsory licensing as little as two
years after the patent is granted, when the product may still be in the
government-required testing process and not sufficiently developed to
be fully worked. 24
Compounding the problems concerning the limited scope of intel-
lectual property protection is the poor enforcement of whatever rights
are protected. For example, some countries do not enforce sanctions
against the copying of sound recordings, motion pictures, and com-
puter software. Injunctive relief, which is invaluable in helping to con-
fine monetary losses, is often not available. Fines for infringement are
too small and usually there are no criminal penalties. Effective means
to obtain evidence of infringement - that is, U.S.-style discovery -
are not available. Moreover, the burden of proof is on the owner of
the intellectual property. Access to a country's courts or administra-
tive procedures is often difficult to gain.25
2. US. Objectives in the Uruguay Round
Broadly stated, the U.S. objective in the Uruguay Round intellec-
tual property negotiations is to achieve clearer, more enforceable rules
governing trade-related intellectual property practices. Specifically,
the United States seeks to establish adequate substantive standards,
effective enforcement of those standards both internally and at the bor-
der, and effective dispute settlement procedures. In addition, the
United States wants basic GATT principles, such as national treat-
22. United States TRIPs Submission, supra note 20, at 4.
23. Id. at 3-4.
24. Id. at 5-6.
25. Id. at 6-7.
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ment and transparency (the provision of clear and reliable informa-
tion), to be applied to trade-related intellectual property. 26
The United States has made a specific proposal in this regard on
copyright, patent, trademark, and trade secret protection. The United
States proposal asserts in part that computer programs, satellite trans-
missions, compilations, and sound recordings must be protected under
copyright laws, as well as newly emerging forms of authorship, and
that the rights of the copyright owner include the right of public dis-
play. 27 The proposal further asserts that patents must be granted for
all products and processes that meet the criteria for patentability, and
the exclusive patent right must cover the product, not just the process
by which it is made. Under the U.S. proposal, the term of patent pro-
tection would be at least twenty years, and the patent would not be
revokable simply because it was not being "worked."'28 Compulsory
licensing for both patents and copyrights would be severely restricted;
exclusive patent and trademark compulsory licenses, which deprive
the intellectual property owner of all rights, would be prohibited. 29
As to the critical area of enforcement of intellectual property
rights, the United States proposal requires that governments assume
the responsibility to take action on their own initiative when necessary
for effective enforcement. Governments also must provide adequate
means for obtaining the evidence necessary to prove infringement and
an opportunity to present such evidence to the decisionmaker. 30 In-
junctive relief and fully compensatory monetary awards are to be
made available. Remedies would include seizure and forfeiture, de-
struction, removal of goods from commercial channels, and criminal
penalties, at least for trademark counterfeiting and copyright
infringement. 3 '
3. Intellectual Property Protection in Korea and Taiwan
For some time now, the United States has been identifying defi-
ciencies in intellectual property protection and rights enforcement that
distort its bilateral trade. This has been necessary because only three
GATT articles explicitly refer to intellectual property rights, 32 and
26. Id.
27. Id. at 8-9.
28. Uruguay Round Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, Sug-
gestion by the United States for Achieving the Negotiating Objective 3-4 (Oct. 17, 1988).
29. Super 301 Fact Sheet, supra note 16, at 10-11.
30. Id. at 15.
31. Id. at 16.
32. GATT, supra note 2, arts. XX:(d), XII:3(c)(iii), XVIII:B(10).
[Vol. 11:307
GATT Uruguay Round
they do not address the distortions that arise from inadequate and in-
effective protection of intellectual property rights.
Two countries (of many) 3  whose treatment of intellectual prop-
erty has been of great concern are Korea and Taiwan. In both coun-
tries, intellectual property piracy has been considered widespread.
In response to American initiatives in 1985-1987, 34 both Korea
and Taiwan adopted new, or revised existing, laws on protection of
patents, copyrights, and trademarks. In 1987, Korea upgraded its pat-
ent law, revised its copyright laws, and passed a computer program
protection act.3 5 Patent coverage was extended to new micro-
organisms, and the government agreed to study the feasibility of ex-
tending copyright protection to databases, semiconductor chips, satel-
lite telecasts, and cable television. The terms of coverage for both
patents and copyrights were extended and the penalties for copyright
infringement were strengthened. 36
Taiwan revised its copyright and trademark laws in 1985, and
adopted a new patent law the following year.3 7 In May 1989, Taiwan
agreed to expeditiously resolve copyright problems concerning
"MTV" (movie-television) parlors, an area of particular United States
concern.
38
Although significant improvements clearly were made in intellec-
tual property protection in Korea and Taiwan prior to 1989, many
problems adversely affecting United States trade remained. Korea's
enforcement of its intellectual property legislation was considered lax;
American industry claimed that the trade impact of inadequate copy-
right enforcement alone exceeded $100 million annually.3 9
Enforcement was likewise considered inadequate in Taiwan.
33. In implementing the "Special 301" provisions of the Omnibus Trade and Competitive-
ness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1302, 102 Stat. 1107, 1179-81 (to be codified at 19
U.S.C. § 2242), the U.S. Trade Representative named seventeen countries to a "Watch List" and
eight to a "Priority Watch List." Special 301 Fact Sheet, supra note 15, at 1-3. Thus, problems
with respect to the adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights were certainly
not isolated to Korea and Taiwan (which were both included on the Priority Watch List).
34. See supra note 15; see also Determination Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 51
Fed. Reg. 29,445 (1986) (describing intellectual property reforms undertaken by Korea in re-
sponse to section 301 investigation).
35. Special 301 Fact Sheet, supra note 15, at 4-5.
36. Bello & Holmer, US. Trade Law and Policy Series #10: Significant Recent Develop-
ments in Section 301 Unfair Trade Cases, 21 INT'L LAW. 211, 222-23 (1987).
37. Special 301 Fact Sheet, supra note 15, at 5.
38. Id. at 4. Despite the existence of the 1985 copyright law, American videotapes are shown
publicly in these parlors without payment of royalties. This popular practice was responsible for
a thirty to fifty percent drop in 1988 theatrical earnings in Taiwan by the United States motion
picture industry. U.S. Trade Rep., National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers
166 (1989) [hereinafter National Trade Estimate Report].
39. Id. at 120.
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There were no provisions for confiscating infringing goods under the
patent law. The copyright law allowed authorities to seize infringing
goods, but not to confiscate them.4° The laws were often ambiguous
and gave much discretion to judges and prosecutors. 41
In addition, coverage under Taiwan's laws remained incomplete.
The patent law did not provide for patenting micro-organisms, food-
stuffs, new animal and plant varieties, or semiconductors. 42 Trade
secrets were not protected at all.43 Compulsory licensing provisions
also remained sweeping. 44 The Taiwan National Bureau of Standards
maintained very strict standards for trademark registration, which ef-
fectively prevented many United States firms from obtaining protec-
tion under the law and successfully prosecuting infringers.45
Based on such inadequacies in both Korea's and Taiwan's protec-
tion of intellectual property rights as of the Spring of 1989, Korea and
Taiwan, along with six other countries, were named to the "Priority
Watch List" established by the U.S. Trade Representative. 46 While
neither was named a "priority country" under "Special 301" (which
would have required self-initiation of investigation under section 301),
inclusion on the Priority Watch List signaled that the U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative would accord priority attention to making intellectual
property progress with those countries,4 7 including through multilat-
eral negotiations in the case of Korea.
4. Cross-Fertilization Between Multilateral and Bilateral Initiatives
On November 1, 1989, the U.S. Trade Representative announced
that both Korea and Taiwan were being transferred from the Priority
Watch List to the Watch List, based on the "[s]ignificant,... genuine
progress" toward adequate and effective protection of intellectual
property rights in each country.4 It appeared that, at least in part,
this determination was the result of progress in the Uruguay Round
intellectual property negotiations (in the case of Korea) as well as bi-
40. Id. at 165.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 167.
43. Id. at 165.
44. Id. at 167.
45. Id. at 165.
46. Special 301 Fact Sheet, supra note 15; see also supra note 33.
47. U.S. Trade Rep. Fact Sheet, "Special 301" on Intellectual Property (May 15, 1989) (on
file at U.S. Trade Rep.).
48. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Hills Announces Results of Special 301 Review 1 (Nov. 1,
1989) (on file at U.S. Trade Rep.).
[Vol. 11:307
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lateral action. 49 At least to date, then, the U.S. is implementing its
domestic law ("Special 301") in a bilateral context (in separate discus-
sions with Korea and Taiwan) 50 in a manner intended and effected to
promote multilateral protection of intellectual property.
Just as the Uruguay Round initiatives in intellectual property pro-
tection have facilitated bilateral progress, achievements with Korea
and Taiwan cross-fertilize and energize momentum in Geneva multi-
lateral negotiations. Favorable developments with respect to Korea
and Taiwan5' thus make it more likely that the U.S. can achieve its
Uruguay Round goals.
B. Services
Services are not currently covered under the GATT, yet they con-
stitute a significant segment of global economic production. As of
1985, the service sector accounted for the largest share of the GNP in
most countries, from around forty percent in lesser-developed coun-
tries to almost sixty-seven percent in developed market-economy
countries. Consequently, tensions have arisen as American providers
of services have sought access to foreign markets that seek to protect
their domestic services from foreign competition.
The United States goal in the Uruguay Round is to develop princi-
ples and procedures for reducing barriers to trade in services. Such
barriers include restrictions on the transfer of information, movement
of personnel, forms of establishment, issuance of licenses, and size of
commercial presence in the marketplace. Governments also distort in-
ternational trade in services by providing subsidies to domestic service
providers and by discriminating in favor of domestic services in such
critical matters as access to local distribution networks, local firms and
personnel, and domestic customers.5 2 The United States wants the
GATT principles of national treatment, transparency, and nondis-
crimination applied to services and seeks a governmental commitment
to ensure that foreign service providers are considered in the promul-
gation of new regulatory measures. 53
An example of governmental restrictions placed on services is Ko-
rea's "negative list" of certain service sectors. In these sectors, foreign
49. Id. at 5.
50. Id. at 3-4.
51. Id.
52. Services Group, U.S. Trade Rep., Concepts for a Framework Agreement in Services 4-5
(undated) (on file at U.S. Trade Rep.).
53. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Uruguay Round Update 4 (May 1989) (on file at the Commerce
Dep't).
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investment is prohibited or severely circumscribed through equity par-
ticipation or other restrictions. Even in those sectors where foreign
investment is allowed, cumbersome and arbitrary regulations often
limit the scope of activities to those already provided by well-estab-
lished domestic competitors.5 4 Taiwan's quota system, which limits
the number of United States entrants into its insurance markets, pro-
vides another example.
Opening Korea's services market to foreign competition is an im-
portant American priority. U.S. investors and service providers are
especially interested in opening the professional services (accounting,
legal, and financial services), advertising, insurance, transportation,
motion picture distribution, and telecommunications markets. 55
Progress has been made in recent bilateral negotiations with Korea
in many of these areas and it has been opening its services market by
removing sectors from the negative list.56 In 1985 the Korean govern-
ment announced a schedule for liberalizing the importation and exhi-
bition of foreign motion pictures. 7 Recently, Korea established
timetables for permitting foreign investment in advertising agencies,
with full liberalization to be achieved by 1991. By 1991, Korea will
also permit full foreign participation in travel agency services.58 In
addition, Korea has recently liberalized the process for obtaining a
trading license to enable foreign firms to distribute products more
freely and has indicated that foreign direct investment in data base and
data processing will be allowed in 1990. 59
In 1986, Korea opened its $5-billion-a-year life and fire insurance
market to foreign investors. 6° Korea agreed to license, and has been
licensing, qualified United States firms to participate fully in the mar-
ket. The Korean government also committed to provide all necessary
information on applicable technical requirements. 6' The American
firms are free to establish Korean operations in whatever form suits
them - joint ventures, branches, or wholly-owned subsidiaries. 62
54. National Trade Estimate Report, supra note 38, at 120-21.
55. Id. at 121.
56. Id.
57. Subcomm. on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs 8 (1989) (testi-
mony of Assistant U.S. Trade Rep. Peter F. Allgeier) (on file at U.S. Trade Rep.) [hereinafter
Testimony of Assistant U.S. Trade Rep. Peter F. Allgeier].
58. Letter from Tong-Jin Park, Ambassador of Republic of Korea, to Ambassador Carla A.
Hills, U.S. Trade Rep., at 6-7 (May 19, 1989) (discussing actions to be taken by Korean Govern-
ment regarding U.S. investment in Korea) (on file at U.S. Trade Rep.).
59. National Trade Estimate Report, supra note 38, at 121.
60. Testimony of Assistant U.S. Trade Rep. Peter F. Allgeier, supra note 57, at 7.
61. Bello & Holmer, supra note 36, at 221.
62. Testimony of Assistant U.S. Trade Rep. Peter F. Allgeier, supra note 57, at 8.
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Bilateral negotiations have also resulted in significant progress to-
ward opening Taiwan's insurance market. In 1987, United States in-
surance companies were allowed to open branch offices of a majority-
owned joint venture with an existing domestic insurance company.
These openings are limited to a maximum of two life and two non-life
insurance branches each year, however. 63 In a recent agreement, to be
implemented by spring 1990, the Taiwan government will propose a
revision to the current insurance law permitting the establishment of
mutual insurance firms and the liberalization of constraints on market
entry such as the quota.64 Further bilateral agreements still will be
necessary to remove the remaining discriminatory barriers American
insurance companies face in Taiwan, however. Branches of United
States mutual insurance companies are still not allowed to open in Tai-
wan, and United States insurance firms are prohibited from establish-
ing subsidiaries and joint ventures with Taiwan non-insurance
enterprises.65
Bilateral negotiations with Korea continue, particularly in the area
of Korea's telecommunications service market. The liberalization of
this market is one of the United States' most important remaining
services objectives. 66 In February 1989, Korea was designated as a
priority country under the telecommunications provisions of the Om-
nibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.67 Negotiations focused
on both the services and equipment aspects of U.S.-Korea trade in
telecommunications, while at the same time the United States pursued
GATT agreements concerning multilateral telecommunications trade.
The United States expects that this continued two-pronged ap-
proach, both multilateral and bilateral, will succeed in further opening
telecommunications markets around the globe, including the Korean
and Taiwanese markets, to United States investors and service
providers.
C. Investment
Trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) are government-im-
posed restrictions on foreign investment. TRIMs are widely used,
often in an ad hoc, non-transparent, and discriminatory manner.
Some are inherently trade-distorting, while others distort trade in
63. National Trade Estimate Report, supra note 38, at 167.
64. Statement of Ambassador Carla A. Hills, supra note 18, at 4-5.
65. National Trade Estimate Report, supra note 38, at 167.
66. Testimony of Assistant U.S. Trade Rep. Peter F. Allgeier, supra note 57, at 9.
67. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., USTR to Seek Negotiations with EC and Korea Over Tele-
communications Market Access (Feb. 21, 1989) (on file at U.S. Trade Rep.).
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some but not all circumstances. Their relationship to the GATT is
complex; inherently trade-distorting TRIMs are inconsistent with
GATT provisions, while other TRIMs are not.68
The imposition of performance requirements as a condition of per-
mitting a foreign investment is a primary means by which govern-
ments restrict such investment. Performance requirements include
requirements to export a certain portion of production or services, use
local content, accept or achieve a given level or percentage of local
equity, or manufacture locally, among others.69
Such TRIMs produce three categories of adverse trade effects. An
increase of exports results from TRIMs which require or induce the
investor to export. TRIMs which favor domestic products over like
imported products or act as a quantitative restriction on imports cause
a reduction of imports. Likewise, exports are reduced by TRIMs
which discourage exports or function as quantitative restrictions on
exports. Export performance requirements imposed on foreign direct
investors may induce dumping and may be equivalent to subsidies. 70
Moreover, such effects generally impair the ability of an investing en-
terprise to respond accurately to developments in the marketplace,
thus distorting manufacturing patterns.71
Traditionally, Korea used a variety of TRIMs, in combination
with import restrictions, to promote its indigenous manufacturing ca-
pabilities in important industries or products. 72 The Korean govern-
ment used a discretionary case-by-case investment approval process
which allowed it to delay or place trade-distorting conditions on indi-
vidual investment projects in order to accomplish certain industrial
policy objectives. 73 The approval process formerly set arbitrary ceil-
ings on the value of investment capital for some foreign distribution
businesses.74 In addition, Korean regulations restricted investment in
several sectors and set explicit conditions for investment in certain in-
dustries.75 These restrictive regulations are of particular concern to
68. Uruguay Round Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Submission
by the United States 2 (July 1989).
69. Letter from Ambassador Carla A. Hills, U.S. Trade Rep., to Tong-Jin Park, Ambassador
from Republic of Korea 4 (May 19, 1989) (discussing consultations between Korea and U.S.
regarding investment in Korea) (on file at U.S. Trade Rep.) (hereinafter Letter from Carla A.
Hills to Ambassador Park].
70. Uruguay Round Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Statement
by the US. Delegation 3 (undated) [hereinafter United States Statement].
71. Id. at 1.
72. Testimony of Assistant U.S. Trade Rep. Peter F. Allgeier, supra note 57, at 10.
73. National Trade Estimate Report, supra note 38, at 121.




the U.S. business community, which recommended that they be items
of first priority in GATT negotiations on investment. 76
The United States recently achieved a comprehensive investment
agreement with Korea, effective July 1, 1989, which will significantly
liberalize conditions for United States investments. Under this agree-
ment, the formal or informal imposition of performance requirements
as a condition of permitting foreign investment, or as a condition for a
tax incentive is prohibited, with certain limited exceptions. Beginning
in 1991, the approval system will be replaced by an investment notifi-
cation system under which an investor will be required merely to no-
tify the Korean government of his intention to invest. 77 If not
disapproved within sixty days, the investment can proceed automati-
cally; only certain specific reasons, such as protection of national se-
curity or violation of Korea's antitrust laws, will justify disapproval. 78
This system will prevent the imposition of informal performance re-
quirements. 79 Once established, all foreign investment will be ac-
corded national treatment, with limited exceptions for designated
purposes.80
The investment objectives the United States is achieving with Ko-
rea as a result of bilateral negotiations parallel the goals the United
States seeks to achieve in the Uruguay Round with regard to TRIMs.
It is established GATT practice to prohibit measures that are inher-
ently trade-distorting and to provide other disciplines for measures
that distort trade in certain circumstances. The United States has pro-
posed that this established practice be extended to TRIMs that are not
already covered by the GATT and that prohibitions should apply with
respect to both domestic and foreign investors. The United States has
proposed that other disciplines should apply to non-prohibited
TRIMs, including a commitment to use such TRIMs only on a non-
discriminatory basis and to use only non-prohibited TRIMs that do
not produce adverse trade effects. 8' The adoption of further GATT
measures governing TRIMs will reinforce American efforts to urge
Korea to adopt non-discriminatory and transparent practices for
United States investments.
Taiwan seems to use its approval process and incentives to en-
76. New Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Hearings on S. 1865 and S.1837 Before
the Senate Comm. on Finance, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (July 23, 1986) (statement of William R.
Pearce, representing U.S. Chamber of Commerce) [hereinafter Statement by William R. Pearce].
77. Testimony of Assistant U.S. Trade Rep. Peter F. Allgeier, supra note 57, at 11.
78. Letter from Carla A. Hills to Ambassador Park, supra note 69, at 6.
79. Testimony of Assistant U.S. Trade Rep. Peter F. Allgeier, supra note 57, at 11.
80. Letter from Carla A. Hills to Ambassador Park, supra note 69, at 1.
81. United States Statement, supra note 70, at 3.
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courage direct foreign investment in high technology and large-scale,
capital-intensive industrial sectors.82 However, Taiwan maintains a
negative list prohibiting or restricting foreign investment in certain in-
dustries.83 Any future bilateral negotiations in the investment area
with Taiwan should be facilitated if the U.S.-proposed standards for
TRIMs are adopted at the Uruguay Round.
D. Agriculture
Unlike intellectual property, services, and many TRIMs, agricul-
tural subsidies are encompassed by the current GATT. Because mem-
ber nations strongly assert divergent views on the issue of farm
subsidies, however, a multilateral consensus on whether and how agri-
culture should be subsidized has never been reached. As a result, ex-
isting GATT rules are highly ambiguous and essentially incapable of
governing subsidy use in the agricultural sector. Over the years, agri-
culture has become the exception to the relatively strong GATT sub-
sidy disciplines that apply to most other products.
The United States is still the world's leading farm product ex-
porter, but the prospects for growth of the agricultural sector are sub-
stantially dependent on the growth of foreign sales.84 Both Korea and
Taiwan have been targets of American initiatives aimed at opening
their restricted markets. Korea has many agricultural import restric-
tions which the United States believes are inconsistent with GATT.8 5
Both countries have high tariffs on agricultural produce. For example,
Taiwan imposes a forty percent tariff on sugar confectionery and Ko-
rea imposes a fifty percent duty for most fresh fruits and fruit juices.8 6
Import licenses are required for most or all agricultural products and
some products are subject to quotas or banned from importation. 87
Both countries also employ highly restrictive sanitary standards and
testing requirements for some agricultural goods which work to pro-
tect domestic producers of comparable products, rather than to pro-
vide quality or safety assurances as would be consistent with
international practice.88
The United States has been seeking, and continues to seek, the
82. National Trade Estimate Report, supra note 38, at 167.
83. Id.
84. Statement by William R. Pearce, supra note 76.
85. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Hills: Korea to Liberalize Trade and Investment (May 18,
1989) (on file at U.S. Trade Rep.).
86. National Trade Estimate Report, supra note 38, at 115, 163.
87. Id. at 116, 163-64.
88. Id. at 119, 164.
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elimination of all quantitative restrictions in Korea and Taiwan. Ne-
gotiations with Taiwan have led to that country's proposal in May
1989 of simplified import licensing procedures. 89 On April 8, 1989,
Korea announced the liberalization by 1991 of 243 agricultural and
fisheries products. 90 By the terms of this agreement, Korea has com-
mitted to open its market to seventy out of some 140 products identi-
fied by the United States as priorities for its exporters. The import
restrictions on these products will be lifted in three stages, with com-
plete removal to be effected by January 1, 1991.91 Korea will also
reduce tariffs on seven products important to United States export-
ers.92 Earlier in 1989, Korea agreed to abolish its "surveillance list,"
which was used to monitor imports of recently liberalized products in
order to restrict them if they increased substantially.93
Negotiations will lead to further liberalization of agricultural trade
in both of these markets. At present the United States and Taiwan are
developing an action plan for accomplishing this purpose, and bilat-
eral discussions are ongoing with Korea.94 Agricultural subsidy
problems, however, are difficult to solve in the absence of a broad mul-
tilateral agreement, because any government that agrees to eliminate
subsidies in a bilateral agreement places its producers at a competitive
disadvantage with respect to countries that have not assumed a similar
obligation.95 The long-term solution preferred by the United States is
to achieve improvements in multilateral disciplines and enforcement
procedures in the Uruguay Round. The United States is thus pursuing
the elimination of a number of agricultural subsidies through multilat-
eral negotiations in the Uruguay Round.
The original United States proposal to GATT called for the com-
plete elimination, over 10 years, of nearly all forms of government sup-
port to agriculture, with the intent of shifting agricultural support
from an essentially production-based system to a producer-based sys-
tem worldwide. 96 The supports to be eliminated include market price
supports, income supports, and other indirect supports, as well as ex-
89. Statement of Ambassador Carla A. Hills, supra note 18, at 4.
90. Office of the U. S. Trade Rep., Hills Announces Agreement with Korea on Agriculture I
(May 19, 1989) (on file at U.S. Trade Rep.) [hereinafter Hills Announcement].
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2.
93. National Trade Estimate Report, supra note 38, at 117.
94. Super 301 Fact Sheet, supra note 16, at 4.
95. Id. at 8.
96. U.S. Trade Rep., Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee Report 1.
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port subsidies and import restrictions. 97 All agricultural commodities
would be covered - food, beverages, forest products, fish, and fish
products. 98 If the United States proposal were implemented, it would
establish subsidy disciplines for agriculture that are even stricter than
those currently applied to industrial trade.
To implement these objectives, member nations would phase out
all policies that directly or indirectly subsidize agriculture, except for
bona fide foreign and domestic aid programs and direct income pay-
ments that are decoupled from production and marketing. 99 Each
country would have the flexibility to determine which programs to cut
and would develop its own process for monitoring progress. Each
country also would develop special rules for safeguards, enforcement,
and dispute settlement. Countries would also be required to harmo-
nize health and sanitary regulations and to base domestic regulations
on internationally agreed standards.1°
More recently the U.S. has proposed the "tariffication" of all
trade-distorting agricultural business. Bilateral negotiations will help
to perform the task of helping to structure particular means by which
this process is carried out, thus complementing the multilateral negoti-
ations on generic rules to discipline agricultural trade practices. Im-
proved access for agricultural products remains a matter of major
concern for the United States, which intends to pursue the issue in
both bilateral and multilateral fora. 01
III. CONCLUSION
In choreographing its trade policy, the.United States - like most
of its trading partners - uses multilateral, plurilateral, bilateral, and
(more rarely) unilateral action. Its emphasis among these types of ap-
proaches has shifted over time. Initially, the U.S. concentrated heav-
ily on the GATT, then relied more on other types of measures, and
currently aims to restore the preeminence of the GATT and the multi-
lateral forum through the Uruguay Round.
Even in the unlikely event that the Uruguay Round succeeds be-
yond U.S. negotiators' most optimistic hopes, the U.S. will continue to
complement its multilateral activities with plurilateral, bilateral, and
unilateral action on occasion. To the extent that the Uruguay Round





101. Hills Announcement, supra note 90, at 5-6.
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succeeds, such complementary action will be less necessary and, per-
haps, less frequently invoked. To the extent that the Uruguay Round
fails, conversely, such creative complementary action will be needed
and therefore more frequently invoked.
In either event, the recent, substantial reforms agreed to or under-
taken by Korea and Taiwan are significant. Hopefully they serve as a
prelude to even more comprehensive, more effective multilateral trade
disciplines that will shape the U.S. bilateral relationship with Korea
and Taiwan. To the extent that the Uruguay Round fails, recent de-
velopments with respect to Korea and Taiwan at least augur well for
the prospects that trade problems with each of these countries can
continue to be resolved amicably, without resort to confrontational
unilateral action.
